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REFOCUSING THE NEW EVIDENCE
SCHOLARSHIP *
Terence J. Anderson**
A COMMENT ON ROBERT S. THOMPSON'S
"DECISION, DISCIPLINED INFERENCES AND THE
ADVERSARY PROCESS
At the Boston symposium in 1985, Richard Lempert developed a
metaphor that remains evocative: debates among probability theorists
over the validity and applicability of their various theories in the con-
text of litigation might well appear to lawyers to be like great powers
fighting old wars and testing new weapons on Belgian territory with-
out much regard for local terrain.1 Robert Thompson, in my view,
has assumed the role of experienced ambassador and usefully
presented the Belgian perspective in an effort to explain again to the
contending powers why their efforts and weapons are misdirected in
significant ways.2 I shall assume here the role of the Belgian peasant
called from the fields to develop those views from a consumer's per-
spective. I shall use that role to highlight what I see as three of the
central points established by Thompson's argument and to develop
some corollaries that I hope will persuade those engaged in the "new
evidence scholarship" (the story theorists, as well as the probability
theorists) that their work should be refocused to take into account
more fully the various standpoints of its potential users. The role will
permit me, I trust, to ignore some of the constraints of diplomacy.
Let me begin by articulating three propositions that I think are
common ground for all, contending powers and Belgians alike:
1. The principles of logic-inductive, abductive, and deductive-
can be applied to any mass of data that constitutes evidence from
© Copyright 1991 by Terence J. Anderson. All rights reserved.
•* Professor, University of Miami School of Law. This comment is informed by my work
with William Twining over the years and has benefitted from his comments on a preconference
draft. I am grateful for both his long-term and immediate contributions to my thinking. I
have left the text largely as presented at the conference; I have added footnotes to amplify or
clarify points suggested in the text.
I The papers and comments that were delivered at the Boston Symposium on "Probability
and Inference in the Law of Evidence" were subsequently published. 66 B.U.L. REV. 377-952
(1986). Lempert's metaphor was reported by one commentator. Twining, The Boston Sympo-
sium: A Comment, 66 B.U.L. REV. 391, 393 (1986).
2 Thompson, Decision, Disciplined Inferences and the Adversary Process. 13 CARDOZO L.
REV. 725 (1991).
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which we wish to reconstruct past events in order to resolve dis-
puted questions of fact.
2. The propositions established by these data and those proffered as
possible inferred propositions can be articulated and can be or-
ganized and marshalled as arguments bearing upon the resolution
of such disputed questions of fact.
3. Systems exist for depicting these propositions in symbols and for
depicting the claimed logical relationships among them in graphic
or charted form.3
If I am correct in the view that these propositions are essentially
noncontroversial, two issues seem central to the contending powers-
one concerns the atomists and holists and the other frames the de-
bates among the probability theorists-both of which raise matters of
concern among us Belgians:
1. Are the kinds of rigdrous, atomistic, logical analysis and charting
of evidential data and arguments that can be done useful in fact in
the context of litigation, and if so, by whom and for what
purposes?
2. Can formal systems of probabilistic reasoning and decision mak-
ing contribute anything of practical utility in assessing the
strength of particular inferential relationships or of the multiple
and complex relationships that bear upon the disputed questions
in a case as a whole?
The first issue, as I conceive it, is one that gives rise to perceived dis-
agreements between the atomists and the holists, the logicians and the
story folk. 4 The second issue has been perceived as a source of dis-
agreements between the Baconians and the mathematicists and of the
disagreements among those within each group. In my view, Thomp-
son's Decision, Disciplined Inferences and the Adversary Process lays a
foundation for concluding that the present debates and disagreements
are misconceived in some fundamental ways and that much of the
3 The points are developed and a tutorial for their application in the context of litigation is
provided in T. ANDERSON & W. TWINING, ANALYSIS OF EVIDENCE (1991). Fact skeptics
and others have claimed that the first proposition is open to question, but they have largely
assumed its validity in their own work. See W. TWINING, RETHINKING EVIDENCE 32-91
(1990) (describing the rationalist tradition, its dominance in evidence scholarship, and the as-
sumptions that underlie it).
4 The dichotomy is rarely so sharp as this comment may suggest. Most of the papers in
this symposium are by authors who believe that logical and detailed reasoning is crucial. In
context, the most illustrative is Schum & Tillers, Marshalling Evidence for Adversary Litiga-
tion, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 657 (1991). The story theorists are also ably represented. See
Pennington & Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision Making, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 519.
I doubt that representatives from either camp would seriously question the value of the work
being done in the other. See infra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
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work that has been done could usefully be redirected and the debates
refocused. Thompson develops three points that I see as the founda-
tion for this view--one explicitly and at length, the other two, implic-
itly and with less emphasis than I think they deserve.
First, the common-law model of adjudication cannot be recon-
ciled with the introduction of a general requirement that judges or
juries calculate or use mathematical probabilities (subjective or objec-
tive) or other formal decision theories to reach or to justify the factual
determinations upon which the judgment on a case-as-a-whole is
based.5 Thompson states the point more diplomatically, but in my
view his detailed account of the system and the values it serves, in
addition to information processing, supplements the work of Twin-
ing,6 Zuckerman,7 and others' in ways that justify this stronger asser-
tion without further amplification at this stage ,of the proceedings.
Second, Thompson implicitly makes a further and related point
that does merit further development: In principle, the adversarial sys-
tem is designed to assure generally sound processing of information
and resolution of questions of fact because it assigns primary responsi-
bility for atomistic analysis and evaluation to the contending lawyers
and appropriately restricts the amount of information and the manner
of its presentation to the ultimate decision maker, be it judge or jury.9
The probability theorists have, in my view, yet to explain how full
implementation of their theories could significantly improve the accu-
racy of the factual determinations required, quite apart from any mis-
chief such implementations might cause by undermining the other
values that properly inform trial court judgments. I think Ward Ed-
wards may be the last committed probabilist who has not acknowl-
edged this in any degree, so I will develop the point using illustrations
from foreign territories in which he works.
Whatever one's view of the merits, I assume all would agree that
the President and his senior subordinates recently had to make deci-
sions that had significant factual components, but that also required
them to take into account political and other significant values. The
decision to launch an attack on Iraq on January 16, 1991 required, I
5 See Thompson, supra note 2, at 728-30, 746-56.
6 See, e.g., W. TWINING, supra note 3, at 117-34.
7 Zuckerman, Law, Fact or Justice?, 66 B.U.L. REV. 487 (1986).
8 The arguments of others fall generally into two categories-arguments that the use of
mathematical forms of reasoning would distort the other values incident to the common-law
trial (see, e.g., Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84
HARV. L. REV. 1329 (1971)), and arguments that the reasoning necessary to resolve disputed
questions of fact is, in significant part, nonmathematical in principle (see, e.g., L.J. COHEN,
THE PROBABLE AND THE PROVABLE (1977)).
9 See Thompson, supra note 2, at 744-55.
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assume, complex factual determinations about the kind, amount, and
quality of Iraq's armed forces and equipment and their state of
preparedness; about the allied state of readiness; and so on. So too,
the decision to launch a ground attack five weeks later had similar
factual components. I assume that all would concede that the presi-
dent was properly required to take into account factors and values in
addition to those dictated by the information processing that in-
formed the factual determinations required.
I should like to think that Edwards and I would share common
ground on two points. First, I hope we would agree that it would
have been neither useful nor appropriate for the president to pull a
little personal computer around to aid him, as does Edwards's doctor
friend,' ° or to require that the pool of citizens eligible to be president
be restricted to those who have mastered "Bayes nets" and have the
capacity to construct, use, or understand "influence diagrams" of the
kind that Edwards reports are in vogue in Palo Alto."' Second, I am
confident that we would agree (although it may surprise him) that the
intelligence officers at various levels charged with analyzing the data,
constructing and testing appropriate hypotheses, marshalling and cri-
tiquing arguments, and developing the principal contending scenarios
that will be presented to those charged with resolving any disputed
questions of fact necessary to the ultimate decision should include
analysts who understand and apply David Schum's lovely two-vol-
ume work 2 (and who should probably be informed about what is go-
ing on in the Palo Alto area).
The point to be recognized is that the adversary process and the
common-law model of adjudication allocate roles and functions in a
similarly appropriate fashion. The primary responsibility for analysis
is among the responsibilities assigned to lawyers. It is they who ana-
lyze the data; construct and critique hypotheses and arguments; and,
where necessary develop what they see as the strongest theory of the
case on each side, marshall the evidence and arguments that best sup-
port (or confound) the contending theories, and construct the stories
that they will urge the ultimate decision maker to adopt.
The common-law model in which the trial is "a separate and iso-
lated event"' 13 in which contending adversaries present evidence they
10 Edwards, Comment. Summing Up: The Society of Bayesian Trial Lawyers, 66 B.U.L.
Rev. 937, 937 (1986).
11 Edwards, Influence Diagrams, Bayesian Imperialism, and the Collins Case: An Appeal to
Reason, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 1031 (1991) (describing influence diagrams and arguing for
their use in adjudicative decision making).
12 D. SCHUM, EVIDENCE AND INFERENCE FOR THE INTELLIGENCE ANALYST (1987).
13 Thompson, supra note 2, at 748.
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have culled from the universe of available and potentially relevant
data and present the contending theories, arguments, and stories that
they have selected and developed, provides, in principle, a sound
method of processing information to aid the judge or jury in resolving,
efficiently, finally, and accurately, the factual issues necessary to a
judgment that serves important additional values. So long as the ana-
lysts have done their jobs well and made such probabilistic calcula-
tions and assessments as were appropriate or useful, it is hard to see
why we would want a system that would require the ultimate decision
maker to replicate, rather than assess, their work as a basis for resolv-
ing disputed questions of fact necessary to reach a judgment on the
case as a whole.
Third, the litigation process is complex. It is not only complex in
the aspects that Thompson describes, but it is also complex in ways
that were not germane to Thompson's arguments, but that are ger-
mane to this symposium. It is a process that contemplates multiple
phases that have different and varied functions. It is a process that
involves multiple participants who have different roles and objectives
at different stages of the process-not just clients, lawyers, judges, and
juries, but also witnesses, court clerks, law clerks, bailiffs, and others.
It is a process in which the available data are typically complex with
the consequence that the complexity of the possible inferential rela-
tionships is multiplied. And, finally, the litigation process is complex
because it is a process that requires lawyers and clients, as well as
judges and others, to make decisions and take actions based upon as-
sessments of the then state of the evidence at every stage of the pro-
cess and for a variety of different purposes. 4
The point should be obvious, but there remains a seeming reluc-
tance to accept its consequences fully that remains a barrier to useful
collaborations. Schum has long recognized the point, 5 and his recent
work with Tillers has embraced it in many respects. 16 The work of
others, however, seemed in 1985, and seems now, to reject or ignore
it. 17 Some probabilists seem to take the view that the Belgian terrain
14 See T. ANDERSON & W. TWINING, supra note 3, at 340-67 (discussing kinds of decisions
and decision makers, and providing a provisional taxonomy of the standards available to guide
those who must make the various decisions that arise in the context of litigation).
IS See, e.g., Schum, Probability and the Processes of Discovery, Proof and Choice, 66 B.U.L.
REV. 825 (1986).
16 See, e.g., Tillers & Schum, A Theory of Preliminary Fact Investigation, 24 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 931 (1991); Schum & Tillers, supra note 4; but see Twining, Five Cheers for Schum and
Tillers, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 713 (1991) (for a few cavils on the nature of the embrace).
17 See, e.g., Fienberg & Schervish, The Relevance of Bayesian Inference for the Presentation
of Statistical Evidence and for Legal Decisionmaking, 66 B.U.L. REV. 771 (1986); Fienberg,
Comment. Misunderstanding, Beyond a Reasonable Doubt, id. at 651; Edwards, supra note 10
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should be simplified to fit their models. Having advanced an argu-
ment, sometimes compelling, that their model would be a powerful
tool on such a simplified terrain, they express surprise and dismay
when it is ignored by those working with original and unchanged
terrain. 18
These points have corollaries that bear upon the issues posed
above and suggest ways in which the main strands of the new evi-
dence scholarship might productively be redirected. I would like to
suggest a few, only by way of illustration. The first is simple and, I
think, should be noncontroversial. The perceived conflict between the
atomistic logicians and the holistic story theorists is a false conflict
stemming largely from a failure to distinguish among the standpoints
of various participants at the various stages of the litigation process.
The claim that juries choose among (or construct themselves) stories
as the basis for resolving factual disputes in no way diminishes the
need for lawyers to engage in detailed atomistic, logical analysis in
order to identify and test story possibilities in the available evidence;
to select the most plausible accounts and marshall the data and argu-
ments that support them; to identify story possibilities available to the
opponent; and to marshall the data and arguments necessary to em-
phasize flaws in these stories that are likely to 'impress the jury as
substantial.'9 For the most part, the work of the story theorists is and
should be welcome stuff in the trenches and academies of Belgium.
This is a point Twining has developed at some length,20 and one
which he and I have presented in a form suitable for use by Belgians
and would-be Belgians. 2t The point, if accepted, simply suggests that
greater collaboration among story theorists, and those engaged in al-
lied enterprises, and lawyers might advance the agendas of all in use-
22ful ways.
(then); compare, e.g., Edwards, supra note 11, at 1044 ("The main problem in constructing a
model of a case is to avoid too much detail. My first attempt to model the Collins case [People
v. Collins, 68 Cal. 2d 319, 483 P.2d 33, 66 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1968)] was disastrous because I
included every putative uncertainty I could think of.") (now).
18 See Edwards, supra notes 10-11 (for the views of the most persistent representative of
the camp).
19 See T. ANDERSON & W. TWINING, supra note 3, at 165-71 and 257-66 (development of
point), 278-89 (illustrative materials).
20 See W. TWINING, supra note 3, at 219-61 (for a discussion of "lawyers' stories").
21 See materials cited supra note 19.
22 Thompson's paper does suggest some specific areas that may merit collaborative atten-
tion. For example, Thompson identifies lawyer practices that are inconsistent with the values
of the adjudicative model and procedures that are frequently misused. Thompson, supra note
2, at 770-71, 773-75, 779-80. His point might well be extended to consider the limits that
should be observed by lawyers in constructing and urging stories before the adjudicative tribu-
nal. This seems to me to be an area in which both academic lawyers and story theorists might
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The more important corollaries I would derive are directed to-
ward the probability theorists. All of these suggest that they have
paid too little attention both to the concept of standpoint and to the
various standpoints that lawyers must take, given the roles assigned
them in the litigation process.23 The fact that lawyers are assigned
primary responsibility for analyzing the data and constructing and
criticizing arguments at every stage of the process suggests that
probabilists might usefully expand or redirect their work to consider
the different kinds of factual conclusions lawyers are required to make
and the decisions and actions they are required to take at various
stages in the process in order to determine whether and how these
conclusions could and should be informed by probabilistic reasoning.
For those concerned with probability theory in evaluating the ev-
idence in a case as a whole, this would suggest that they might use-
fully redirect their work toward demonstrating how lawyers might
employ probabilistic reasoning in constructing and criticizing avail-
able arguments. For example, Edwards demonstrates convincingly to
me that the trial and resulting arguments in the Collins case24 would
have been improved had counsel for both the prosecution and the de-
fense consulted with experts or been able to analyze the case in the
terms that Edwards suggests.25 That analysis suggests mathemati-
cally based arguments that could have been framed in nonmathemati-
cal terms that either side could have developed to argue that the
Collinses were or were not the guilty parties.26
usefully inform each other's work and address some practical problems whose resolutions
might improve the adversary system.
23 The concept of standpoint, as used here, represents one of Twining's many contributions
to clarifying ways of thinking about law and legal problems. See W. TWINING & D. MIERS,
How To Do THINGS WITH RULES 64-72, 120-22, 184-92 (3d ed. 1991) (concept developed
and uses illustrated); see also T. ANDERSON & W. TWINING, supra note 3, at 120-21, 160
(standpoint in context of fact analysis and litigation).
24 People v. Collins, 68 Cal. 2d 319, 438 P.2d 33, 66 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1968) (reversing
conviction because prosecutor had been permitted to assign speculative probabilities to six
nonindependent identifying characteristics and to use the rule of multiplication to argue that
there was no more than a 1 in 12,000,000 probability that there was a couple in Los Angeles
other than the Collinses who had all six characteristics).
25 Edwards, supra note 11, at 1044-45.
26 The prosecutor might have taken Edwards's analysis, used metaphorical examples such
as the chances that five die would all show a six on a single roll, to plant the idea underlying
the multiplication rule, and used nonmathematical terms to develop the notion that there was
no reasonable doubt that the Collinses were the guilty parties. See T. ANDERSON & W. TWIN-
ING, supra note 3, at 338 (probability table suggesting comparable ways for expressing
probability judgments in mathematical and nonmathematical terminology). The defense
might have developed those "putative doubts" that Edwards found so disastrous to his analysis
(Edwards, supra note 11) to identify the specific doubts and to show how they could be com-
bined and aggregated to establish "reasonable doubt".
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Two more illustrations should suffice for present purposes. First,
a lawyer must reach a tentative conclusion of the likelihood of success
before she decides whether to undertake a case or file a pleading. The
conclusion requires an assessment of the available and potentially
available evidential data and the likelihood that arguments based
upon that data can be developed and marshalled to achieve a desire-
able result. The decision, of course, involves more-the costs and
benefits to the client, the likelihood that action will induce settlement
or alter behaviors in desired ways without the need for protracted
litigation, and so on.27 Second, there is already substantial literature
on how and whether a lawyer and client should settle a case. Deci-
sion theorists, as well as economists, have contributed to this litera-
ture.2" Most the views developed require the participants to reach
conclusions on the probability that liability will be established and on
the probable value of the resulting reward, if liability is established, as
the starting points for the analysis. Insofar as I am aware, no one has
explicitly undertaken to demonstrate how probabilistic systems might
be employed in assessing the evidence as an aid to reaching better
settlement conclusions on those points.29
These seem to me to be the kinds of areas in which probabilists
might be able to make contributions that would persuade lawyers that
their pretrial theories should be employed. Such contributions might
even persuade legislators or courts that use of such theories should be
required to address and correct some systemic pretrial problems and
abuses of the kind that Thompson identifies. 30 The points, corollaries,
and examples I have offered are far from exhaustive. They are in-
tended only to demonstrate that there are additional perspectives that
could and should be explored in greater depth. I should also make it
clear that I am among those Belgians who believe that the contending
powers have made useful contributions. I suggest here only that their
contributions might be more significant and better received if they
27 Thompson identifies prefiling investigation and ongoing trial preparation as areas of con-
cern. In that context, probabilists might usefully consider whether they could provide better
bases for demonstrating that, or deciding whether, an attorney had made "reasonable inquiry,"
and whether an allegation was "well grounded in fact" at the time she signed the pleading in
which it was made, as required by FED. R. Civ. P. 11. I suspect the bar and bench would
welcome tools that enabled them to address this issue more objectively, and I suspect that
work such as Edwards's might well provide guidance in areas such as this.
28 See, e.g., S. NAGEL & M. NEEF, DECISION THEORY AND THE LEGAL PROCESS 141-46
(1979) (decision theory); R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW SCHOOL 522-28 (3d ed.
1986) (economic theory).
29 The kind of reasoning process required to make such assessments is described and illus-
trated in T. ANDERSON & W. TWINING, supra note 3, at 347-48.
30 Thompson, supra note 2, at 767-79.
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paid greater attention to the essential characteristics of the terrain as
it exists and the specific needs of those who till its fields. The precon-
ference papers I reviewed suggest that this symposium should provide
much that we Belgians may find useful.
